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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A BANK FOR MISAPPROPRIATION BY
A FIDUCIARY'
The difficult situation in which New York banks are placed
when handling fiduciary accounts is again called to attention
by the ruling in Cahan v. Empire Trust C0.2 In this case an
agent with authority to draw on his principal's bank account
drew checks payable to himself and deposited them in his indi-
vidual account with the defendant bank, which then collected
them from the drawee bank. He subsequently dissipated his
account. In an action by his principal against the defendant
bank judgment was rendered against the defendant for the
amount of the checks with interest. The court said,3 ".
we hold the form4 of the check should be taken as evidence that
the agent is engaged upon ventures of his own, and as to his au-
thority to conduct the same the bank must assume the risk of
investigation". On the facts, however, since, in addition to
the form of the check, there was the deposit to the agent's personal
account, it is probably unfair to say that the case holds more
than that a check drawn by an agent on his principal's account
payable to himself and deposited in his own private account is
sufficient notice of possible misappropriation to put the bank
in which it is deposited upon inquiry.
This holding is directly contra to Havana Cent. Ry. v. Knicker-
bocker Trust Co.,5 in which the New York Court of Appeals held
the bank receiving the deposit not liable.0 The result of these
cases is that, as to a principal who can meet the jurisdictional
requirements of the federal courts, New York banks collect and
pay out at their peril the proceeds of any such check presented
for deposit, but may do so without peril if these jurisdictional
requirements cannot be met. The federal rule makes it neces-
sary for a New York bank, to be safe, to investigate every such
1 "'Fiduciary' includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied,
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator,
curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public
officer, or any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person,
trust or estate." Uniform Fiduciaries Act, sec. 1., (1923) 9 Uniform Laws
Annotated, 99.
(1926, C. C. A. 2d) 9 Fed. (2d) 713.
SIbid. at 718.
4 Italics ours.
0 (1910) 198 N. Y. 422, 92 N. E. 12, reversing the Appellate Division in
(1909, 1st Dept.) 135 App. Div. 313, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1035.
6 The same plaintiff, getting into the federal court on the ground of
diverse citizenship, then sued the drawee bank. The Circuit Court of
Appeals denied recovery. Havana Cent. Ry. v. Knickerbocker Trist Co.
(1913, C. C. A. 2d) 204 Fed. 546, writ of certiorari denied (1914) 234
U. S. 755, 34 Sup. Ct. 673.
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check presented, or to investigate whether the principal can
properly sue in the federal courts.
The majority of the cases hold that a depository of fiduciary
funds need not inquire into the authority of the fiduciary to
make the deposit, even if made to the personal account of the
fiduciary; nor is it necessary to inquire for what purposes the
withdrawals by the fiduciary are made, whether by checks pay-
able to the fiduciary personally, or as fiduciary, or to third
persons. 7 The bank is responsible, however, when the fiduciary
draws on the fiduciary account, or his own account containing
fiduciary funds, in order to pay his personal indebtedness to the
bank.8
In these general rules no distinction has been drawn among the
various types of fiduciaries. Nor have the cases seemed to make
any distinction; and the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (now adopted
by eight states") expressly lumps all fiduciaries into one class."'
The various cases, however, in which the majority rule has not
been followed have generally been those in which the fiduciary
has had the least power of control over the fiduciary funds. Thus,
it may be that it is proper to distinguish, on the one hand, between
a trustee (executor, administrator, guardian, etc.), who has legal
title to the fund with power of control, and, on the other hand,
an agent or coporate officer, who has neither legal nor equitable
title and has authority only to draw on the account, or to employ
it in a certain way, for his principal. That such a distinction
'may exist is apparently recognized in the Cahtamie case, and the
opinions in the Bishoffr' and Whithig2 cases faintly suggest it. At
7 See cases collected in COMIENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW Jounu,*,, 377,
note 2. See generally McCollom, Liability of Baa s Rccciving Checks To
a. T'rstees Order For Deposit inZ His Individual Acco~nat (1911) 11 Coi.
L. REV. 428; Thulin, Misappropriation By Fidacilay (1918) 6 C,%aLw. L.
Rsv. 171; NoTes (1913) 13 Col. L. REV. 727; Co1mzwisionces' Note (to Uni-
form Fiduciaries Act) (1923) 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, 103.
SBiskwff v. Yorkville Bank (1916) 218 N. Y. 100, 112 N. E. 759; Ward
v. City Trztst Co. (1908) 192 N. Y. 61, 84 N. E. 585; Allen, -. Pritai
Trust Co. (1912) 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916.
9 See (1923) 9 Uniform Laws Annotated, Supplement, 1925, at 12.
10 Supra note 1.
11 " . we shall, so far as possible, avoid decisions dealing with de-
falcations by executors and trustees who had 'title' to the funds they mis-
applied; we shall regard primarily cases arising out of acts by agents
or officers of corporations, both of whom act by procuration and
have no title to the funds with which they deal. We do not assert that
the legal principles involved in these two classes of wrongdoing are basically
different; we but seek to avoid unnecessary prolixity." Supra note 2, at
715. In the case of an ordinary bank deposit, the depositor is a creditor
and the bank a debtor. "Title" means no more than this here.
12 "The title to the funds was in the executor, and he possessed the full
control and disposition of them." Bishoff -. Yorkville Ba k, aupqra note 3,
at 110.
IL "The executor was the owner. Whether he deposited in his own name
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any rate the cases have dealt more severely with banks accepting
such checks. from agents 4 and corporate officers" than from
trustees and others having legal title.10 And in the few cases
holding banks liable for collecting such checks drawn by trustees,
the trustees have generally been of an official nature-sheriffs,
commissioners, etc.-whose trusts by their character precluded
any justification for depositing the fund in a private account.'
It may seem odd, at first blush, to cause a bank to scrutinize more
carefully the acts of an agent than those of a trustee. However,
an agent has less "title" to the fund than a trustee and hence,
ordinarily, less control over it, so that any unusual exercise of
control lends itself more readily to suspicion. It is believed that
this distinction should not be of controlling importance in the
general problem of the bank's responsibility; but it has been
suggested as a possible means of reconciling some of the cases.
That a fiduciary'18 may draw cash from his principal'ss account
or with the addition of the name of the estate, the title was unchanged."
Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co. (1923) 234 N. Y. 394, 406, 138 N. E. 33, 37.
14 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Fidelity T'ust Co. (1898, C. C. A. 9th)
86 Fed. 541; cf. Anderson v. Kissam (1888, C. C. S. D. N. Y.) 35 Fed. 699.
"l Wagner Trading Co. v. Battery Park Nat. Bank. (1920) 228 N. Y.
37, 126 N. E. 347; Underwood, Ltd. v. Bank of Liverpool [1924] 1 I. B.
775. In each of these cases the corporate officer indorsed to himself and
deposited in his own account checks received by the corporation and
drawn to its order as payee. In New York such cases are considered as
different from a drawing by a corporate officer to his own order and a
deposit to his own private account. "They do not reach a case where
the instrument has been collected according to its tenor for the account of
the very person who is named there as payee." Whiting V. Hudson Trust
Co., supra note 13, at 406. But the difference does not seem substantial,
for an indorsement by an officer to himself seems no more than a drawing
by an officer to his own order; in each case the bank has equal notice that
corporate funds are being deposited in a personal account. Under this
analysis the Wagner case, supra, would seem inconsistent with the Havana
case, supra note 5. In Santa Marina Co. v. Canadian Bank of Commerce
(1918, C. C. A. 9th) 254 Fed. 391, the court reached a contrary result
from the New York rule in the Wagner case. If agents and corporate
officers are to be regarded as identical for the purpose of these cases (and
they seem to be), this holding is inconsistent with Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., supra, note 14, decided by the same court. Cf.
(1924) 4 BosToN U. L. REV. 265.
'r But by statute in New York every executor, administrator, guardian,
or testamentary trustee who deposits in his own name funds received from
the estate of a deceased person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. N. Y.
Surro. Ct. Act, 1920, ch. 928, sec. 231.
'7 Bank of Hickory v. McPherson (1912) 102 Miss. 852, 59 So. 934 (com-
missioner) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Peoples Bank (1913)
127 Tenn. 720, 157 S. W. 414 (guardian); see (1913) 27 HAv. L. Rav.
176.
28 Either trustee or agent. See supra note 1.
19 "'Principal' includes any person to whom a fiduciary as such owes an
obligation." Uniform Fiduciaries Act, sec. 1, supra note 1.
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without suspicion is generally admittedY0 There are so many
reasons why cash may be legitimately needed that the likelihood
of misappropriation is too remote to justify the practical business
inconvenience of inquiry by the banks. The legitimate reasons,
however, for the transfer of such funds into the fiduciary's indi-
vidual account are relatively few. -1 This, no doubt, explains the
different treatment accorded by some courts to a drawing of cash
and a drawing for deposit in the fiduciary's private account; some
believe that such a transfer for deposit in a personal account
should constitute notice, as contrasted with no notice in a drawing
of cash.2 This difference indicates that the responsibility of
the bank cannot be predicated on what it did alone, but rather on
what it did together with what it knew or should have known.2-
As the situation now exists in New York a bank accepting a
check from a fiduciary "should have known", i.e., is put upon in-
quiry, (1) when a corporate officer has indorsed checks payable
to the corporation for deposit in his personal accountF (2)
when the bank accepts a fiduciary check in satisfaction of a
personal debt owed to it by the fiduciary,2- and (3) under the
federal rule, when the check has been drawn by an agent or
corporate officer on his principal's account to his own order for
-20 See Fanners' Loan & Tnst Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., Mpra note 14,
at 544, stating that, "When an agent draws a draft in the name of his
principal, and receives from a bank the money therefor, the presumption,
in. the absence of any showing to the contrary, is that he receives the
money in the same capacity in which he draws the draft; that is to say
as agent."
"The drawee bank, it would seem, can pay cash with safety to the payee
officer, as can also an intermediate bank." Thulin, op. cit. supra& note 7,
at 178, see also p. 177; and (1905) 19 HAne. L. Rsv. 69.
'21 (1905) 19 HARv. L. Ru'. 68.
2 Thus, it might seem that a fiduciary could draw cash at the paying
teller's window and deposit it to his individual account at the receiving
teller's window without liability attaching to the bank. Thulin, op. cit.
supra, note 5, at 178. In a large bank where the paying and receiving
teller are not in "privity" with one another such a result might be pozsible,
although if the bank had knowledge of the complete transaction this
formula would not relieve it of responsibility. Cf. Loumdcs v. City Nrat.
Bank (1909) 82 Conn. 8, 72 At. 150.
23 Since the form of the check would be identical whether cashed or de-
posited in the individual account (unless endorsed "for depoit"-which is
not the most usual practice), the form of itself would not seem enough
to put the bank in the position of "should have known." And from this
it follows that the intimation by the New York court in the Havana case,
supra note 5, at 430, that "the depository [drawee bank] may be liable
to the depositor" is fallacious, for the drawee bank can have no evidence
of misappropriation other than that presented by the form of the chec:,
and only if endorsed "for deposit" would it be put upon inquiry.
-1 Supra, note 15.
2 Supra note 8.
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deposit in his personal account.2 0 Referring to situation (1)
Cardozo, J., has said,27 "The cases imposing liability in such
circumstances lay down, however, a strict and at times a hard
rule, and are not to be extended. . . . The transactions of
banking in a great financial center are not to be clogged and their
pace slackened by over-burdensome restrictions." It may well
be questioned whether the requirement to investigate at its peril
is not overburdensome in situation (3), as well as in situation
(1). For it is estimated that eighty-five per cent of the country's
business is transacted by checks2" and that large New York banks
handle over thirty millions of dollars in checks daily.2-  Under
this pressure of business 0 it is banking practice to examine the
face of a collection item only for the amount and the name of the
drawee; not voticing-' the names of the drawer and payee and
their relationship to one another. In so doing the bank relies on
its indorser to make good any loss.
It may be argued that the bank should do this at its peril, and
assume the risk in situations (1) and (3) above.02  It is sub-
mitted, however, that this practice of the banks is forced upon
them by the ever increasing use of checks by the public. In view
of this functional habit of the banks and its practical inescap-
ability under modern -business conditions it seems unsound policy
to put upon the banks the risk of misappropriation in receiving
for deposit in the private account of an agent or corporate officer
a check drawn by such an agent or officer on the principal's or
corporation's account payable to himself,83 or a check drawn fy
20 Cahan v. Empire Trust Co., supra note 2.
27 Whiting v. Hudson Trust Co., loc. cit. supra note 13.
2s Moulton, Money and Banking (1916) Part II, 37.
29 Ibid. 102.
80 In addition to checks as here discussed, there is a large volume of notes,
drafts and other instruments made payable at banks, which present similar
questions for determination.
31 Unless the check is for a very large sum.
32 Or in other words, that reliance by the bank on the indorser warrants
holding the bank liable in situations (1) and (3) and forcing it to look to
the indorser for its relief. The bank, however, cannot be certain of the
integrity of all its depositors. The principal or the corporation can be
more certain of his/its agent's or officer's honesty, or at least has a greater
opportunity to be so than the bank. Since both the principal or corpora-
tion and the bank have to trust the same man, it seems fair to place the
loss, if any, on the one who has had the better chance to form a judgment
before placing that trust in the individual, to wit, on the principal or
corporation. "Those for whom he acts must ever find their protection in
his integrity." Goodwin v. American National Bank (1881) 48 Conn. 550,
568. See also the dissenting opinion in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Fidelity Trust Co., supra note 14.
33 Likewise if made payable to bearer, cash or to the bank in which
deposited.
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a third person payable to the principal or corporation and en-
dorsed to himself by the agent or officer. The great expenditure
of time necessary to scrutinize minutely all checks for such de-
tails and to make inquiry seems prohibitive.2
That the problem involved here is one of business or public
policy- is admitted by the court in the Cahan case.2G Approach-
ing the issue from this angle, the Uniform Fiduciaries Act37 has,
and wisely, it is submitted, taken the opposite view from that of
the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Cahan case~3
TAXATION OF GIFTS IN CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
To prevent evasion of the inheritance tax laws it was necessary
to amend them so as to tax all gifts made in contemplation of
death. This gave rise to great difficulties, since it is almost im-
possible to determine accurately the subjective state of mind of a
donor. Thus there has grown up a large body of decisions deal-
ing with the kinds of conduct on the part of a donor which the
courts find material in determining his state of mind.
A number of earlier cases limited taxable gifts in contemplation
of death to gifts causa vzortis,' but this view has been disapproved,
"contemplation of death" being held to be much more inclusive
than causa mortis. A gift iter vivos is taxable if the evidence
shows it to have been made in contemplation of death. - "In con-
3- In the instant case the court rightly says (at 718) : "At bottom, the
question here depends upon whether the form of such drafts as those at
bar gives clear enough notice that the agent is not acting in the principal's
interest." It is submitted that the answer is that it does not, under exist-
ing banking conditions, even though the agent is depositing in his private
account. Cf. mspr a note 21.
35 It may be said that it is good public policy to place the loss on the
bank, which will probably insure against it and thus distribute it over
the community as a whole. But it is equally practicable to put the burden
of insurance on the principal to require a bond of the fiduciary. In fact
corporate officers, executors and administrators, and official trustees of
any kind usually are under bond. It seems the better policy to require
principals to seek protection in this manner.
sr Supra. note 2, at 719.
37Supra note 1, sec. 9.
3s "The object of the [Uniform Fiduciaries] Act is to relieve perzons deal-
ing with a fiduciary from the heavy responsibility of a constructive inquiry
into the good faith of the fiduciary. In practice such inquiries are im-
possible in the ordinary course of banking and commercial transactions;
and there is involved a risk which should be eliminated, except in cazes of
kmowledge of fraud or personal advantage to the payee or recipient."
(1922) 8 A. B. A. JouR. 641.
In re EdgertoW.s Estate (1898, 3d Dept.) 35 App. Div. 125, 54 N. Y.
Supp. 700; In re Hendrick's Estate (1914, 1st Dept.) 163 App. Div. 413,
148 N. Y. Supp. 511.
2- In re Bottomley's Estate (1920, N. J. Prerog.) 111 At]. 605; cf.
Chambers v. Lamb (1921) 186 Calif. 261, 199 Pac. 33.
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templation of death" does not refer to a general expectation that
death will occur at some time, but to an apprehension of impending
peril.8 It is evident, therefore, that the mere fact that the donor
was aged will not be of great consequence.4 On the other hand,
if the donor was suffering from a serious disease at the date of
his gift, it is strong evidence that he contemplated death. This
evidence would be rebutted by showing that he was ignorant of
his disease,6 or thought it to involve little danger.7
Plans which the donor had made for the future are of primary
importance in determining his state of mind. If he was about to
undergo an operation at the time of the transfer, it is justifiable
to assume a fear of death ;8 but if he was making plans for exten-
sive improvements to his premises,9 or for an extended trip or
8 In re Baker's Estate (1903, 4th Dept.) 83 App. Div. 630, 82 N. Y.
Supp. 390; Conway's Estate v. State (1918, Ind. App.) 120 N. E. 717;
People v. Danks (1919) 289 Ill. 542, 124 N. E. 625.
4In many cases there has been no tax even though the donor was well
advanced in age. In re Desserts' Estate (1913) 154 Wis. 320, 142 N. W.
647 (aged 86) ; In re Spaulding's Estate (1900, 4th Dept.) 49 App. Div. 541,
63 N. Y. Supp. 694 (aged 88); In re Romney's Estate (1922) 60 Utah, 173,
207 Pac. 139 (aged 86); In re Bullard's Estate (1902, 3d Dept.) 76 App.
Div. 207, 78 N. Y. Supp. 491 (aged 83); Appeal of Hillenmeyer (1925) 2
U. S. Board of Tax App. 1322 (aged 72); see Ashcraft, Federal Estate Tax
on Gifts in Contemplation of Death (1924) 6 ILL. L. QUART. 253; Gleason
& Otis, Inheritance Taxation (1922, 3d ed.) 119.
r Rosenthal v. People (1904) 211 Ill. 306, 71 N. E. 1121; People v. Porter
(1919) 287 Ill. 401, 123 N. E. 59; People v. Danks (1919) 289 Ill. 542, 124
N. E. 625; Pedple v. Tavener (1921) 300 Ill. $373, 133 N. E. 211; Abstract
Title & Guaranty Co. v. State (1916) 173 Calif. 691, 161 Pac. 264; State V.
Pabst (1909) 139 Wis. 561, 121 N. W. 351; In re Price's Estate (1909,
Surro.) 62 Misc. 149, 116 N. Y. Supp. 283; In re Thompson's Estate (1914,
Surro.) 85 Misc. 291, 147 N. Y. Supp. 157; In re Birdsall's Estate (1897,
Surro.) 22 Misc. 180, 49 N. Y. Supp. 450; In re Hall's Estate (1923, N. J.
Prerog.) 119 Atl. 669; In re Bottomley's Estate (1920, N. J. Prerog.) 111
At. 605; In re Dupignac's Estate (1924, N. J. Prerog.) 125 Atl. 119; Kun-
hardt v. Bugbee (1925, N. J.) 130 Atl. 660; Shwab v. Doyle (1920, C. C. A.
6th) 269 Fed. 321; In re Beyer's Estate (1920, 1st Dept.) 190 App. Div.
802, 180 N. Y. Supp. 396; Williams v. Guile (1889) 117 N. Y. 343, 22
N. E. 1071; In re Fitzgibbon's Estate (1919, Surro.) 106 Misc. 130, 173
N. Y. Supp. 898; In re Hodges' Estate (1914, Surro.) 86 Misc. 367, 148
N. Y. Supp. 424; In re Clapp's Estate (1917, Surro.) 167 N. Y. Supp.
1082; In re Einstein's Estate (1921, Surro.) 114 Misc. 452, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 931; Edwards' Estate (1921) 1 Penn. D. & C. Rep. 497.
6 Meyer v. United States (1925) 60 Ct. of Claims, 474.
7People v. Kelley (1905) 218 Ill. 509, 75 N. E. 1038; Spreekels v. State
(1916) '00 Calif. App. 363, 158 Pac. 549; In re Mahlstedt's Estate (1901,
2d Dept.) 67 App. Div. 176, 73 N. Y. Supp. 818; In re Cornell's Estatoc
(1901, 3d Dept.) 66 App. Div. 162, 73 N. Y. Supp. 32; Vaughan v. Riordan
(1921, W. D. N. Y.) 280 Fed. 742; Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lucas (1925, W. D.
Ky.) 7 Fed. (2d) 146.
8 Merrifield's Estate v. People (1904) 212 Ill. 400, 72 N. E. 446; Estate
of Reynolds (1915) 169 Calif. 600, 147 Pac. 268.
9 Rea v. Heiner (1925, W. D. Pa.) 6 Fed. (2d) 389.
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vacation,2° it would not seem probable that the donor was antici-
pating death at the same time. The same is true where he was
looking forward to matrimony.-1
If evidence can be obtained of a motive for the transfer other
than a contemplation of death, a strong case is made out against
the taxability of the transfer. Thus where the gift was made to a
member of the donor's family so that he might learn to manage
the property,1- or was made $o that the donor might no longer be
troubled with the care of the property, 1 3 it was not taxed. If a
transfer is made in pursuance of a plan decided upon some time
previously when there was no danger of death, it is likely to be
held not to have been made in contemplation of death."
Other acts of the transferor, done about the same time that he
made the transfer, may give clues to his state of mind and have
evidential value. In cases where the donor made his will at the
time of the transfer, the courts have found that death was con-
templated; '1 but where no will was made until some later date
the contrary inference has been drawn.10 Where the 'res trans-
ferred was stock and the transferor retained one share in order
to keep his voting power, the court decided that there was no
contemplation of death.1
7
It seems almost certain that the legislative purpose in taxing
gifts made in contemplation of death is to prevent loss of revenue
through intentional evasion of the inheritance tax; and yet it is
contemplation of death and not intent to evade the tax that is
made the test of taxation. Indeed, the tax on such a gift seems
not to be collectible until after the donor's death, inasmuch as a
true inheritance tax would not have been collectible prior thereto.
It should be observed, however, that taking by gift inter Vivos
10 Spreckels v. State, spra note 7; Meyer v. United States, supra note 6;
Rea v. Heiner, supra note 9; Van ghan v. Riordan, svpra note 7.
n In re Minar's Estate (1919) 180 Calif. 291, 180 Pac. 813; Poll: v. Milec
(1920, D. Md.) 268 Fed. 175.
'
2 Kelly v. Woolsey (1918) 177 Calif. 325, 170 Pac. 837.
33 McDougald v. Wuizen (1917) 34 Calif. App. 21, 166 Pae. 1033; in re
Desserts' Estate, supra note 4. So also where a wife transferred her
property so that her husband would no longer be burdened with its care.
Meyer v. United States, supra note 6.
1412 re Kueter's Estate (1922) 45 S. Dak. 341, 187 N. W. 625; In re
Crary's Estate (1900, Surro.) 31 Misc. 72, 64 N. Y. Supp. 5G6; Appeal of
Hillenmeyer, supra note 4; Fidelity Tntst Co. v. Lucas, supra note 7.
ISPeople v. Danks, supra note 5; Rosenthal v. People, supra note 5; In
re Snyder's Estate (1925, Calif. App.) 235 Pac. 54; In re HaWs Estate,
supra note 5; In re Dupignac's Estate, supra note 5; Estate of Rcyzrolds,
supra note 8. Also dissenting opinion in In re Maldstedt's Estate, supra
note 7. Where the transferor, a doctor, was seen examining himself with a
stethoscope just prior to the transfer, the gift was held in contemplation of
death. In re Dee's Estate (1913 Surro.) 148 N. Y. Supp. 423.
16 Commonwealth v. Fenley (1920) 189 Ky. 480, 225 S. W. 154.
7 In re Mahlstedt's Estate, supra note 7.
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is not in fact taking by inheritance, since the subject matter vests
at once in the donee's possession and enjoyment. Such gifts
cause the donor to run the risk of poverty and lack of support
and filial care during his remaining years just as other gifts do.
As long as the statutes lay a tax only on gifts made in contemipla-
tion of death, there is no escape from the necessity of introducing
evidence of the donor's state of mind. At the same time, the
inference that the courts will draw from such bits of evidence
must always be very uncertain.
IS AN ELECTION THE EXERCISE OF A POWER?
In re Vcnatt's Estate, decided recently,1 offers an excellent
illustration of the need for clear analysis and discriminating use
of terms. Jacob Vanatta had provided in his will that his widow,
Julia Vanatta, was to receive the income from the estate during
her life, subject to certain provisions in favor of his sister. It
was further provided that she might elect in writing during her
life time to take absolutely and in lieu thereof one half of the
estate remaining after the provisions made for the sister had
been satisfied and after his debts had been paid. And the execu-
tor was authorized and directed to convey to her such portion
if she should so elect.
Soon after the death of her husband, Julia Vanatta elected to
take half of the estate, and in writing directed the executor to
convey it to her. This election was complied with by the execu-
tor, and eventually his administration account was settled.
Subsequently, new assets of the estate of Jacob Vanatta were
discovered, consisting of some shares of stock which had either
been forgotten or had been thought worthless. In the meantime,
Julia Vanatta had died leaving a will. The case arose out of a
contest between the residuary legatees under her will, who
claimed one half of the newly discovered assets, and the residuary
legatees of Jacob Vanatta, who claimed all. Counsel for the lat-
ter claimed, among other things, that Julia Vanatta's estate was
not entitled to take any of these assets on the theory, apparently,
that she had been the donee of a power under her husband's will,
and subject to the rule that powers cannot be exercised after the
death of the donee..
2
Perhaps influenced by this line of argument, the court, in ex-
plaining its decision, saw fit to deny that Julia Vanatta had a
power. The court said, speaking of the brief for the residuary
legatees of Jacob Vanatta:
"This brief seems to have been based upon a misconception of
the rights of the widow under the will, and without making a
1 Prerogative Court of New Jersey, Jan. 8, 1926, 131 AtI, 515,
C hambers v. Tulane (1852) 9 N. J. Eq. 146.
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proper distinction between a 'power' and an 'election'. In my
judgment, the right given to the widow under the will is not a
power but a right to elect between two alternative provisions
under the will."
The court correctly held that half of the new assets should go
to the legatee of Julia Vanatta. To reach this result it was en-
tirely unnecessary to deny that a legal power was conferred upon
the widow by the will of Jacob. Such a power was created, a
power that could not be exercised after Julia's death; but she
properly exercised it before her death in a manner that affected
the whole of Jacob's estate including undiscovered assets.
As has been said, "The lawyer's world is full of powers".2 It
may correctly be said that any human being who can by his acts
produce changes in the legal relations between himself and others,
or between third persons, has a legal power or powers.4 It is
a fundamental error, therefore, to seek to define legal powers
generally with reference to the object upon which they operate,
or with reference to their being created by certain persons, or in
some particular manner. The essence of the power is capacity
to change legal relations. "Whenever a power exists there is at
least one other human being whose legal relations will be altered
if the power is exercised." 5
The court says that Julia Vanatta did not have a power, but
had a "right to elect". Is not an election always the exercise of
a power?o Election in its legal sense has been defined as "the
choice of one of two rights or things, to each one of which the
party choosing has an equal right, but both of which he cannot
have." 7 Or, again, as the "making an act of choice between
two or more courses of conduct, 'implying' that the act was done
under such circumstances that the choice is binding." 1
Without adopting either of these definitions or attempting to
create a new one, it is clear that an election is the making of a
choice between alternatives by an overt manifestation of will,
a manifestation that may consist of words or of other conduct.
It is also clear that if a choice is between alternatives that have
nothing to do with legal relations, such a choice is not the exer.
cise of a legal power. Thus, of an evening one may make a
3 Cook, Hohfeld's Contribtiozs to the Scczcc of Law (1919) 28 YAL.
LAW JoURNAL, 721, 725.
4 Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminzology (1919) 29 YALm LAW Joun-
NAL, 163, 168.
' Cook, op. cit. supra note 3, at 725.
6 The exercise of mere physical strength is of course not involved to
this discussion.
7 See Bliss v. Geer (1880) 7 Ill. App. 612, 617.
8 See Usher v. Waddingham (1892) 62 Conn. 412, 428, 26 Atl. 538, 541.
The present court's definition is "the choice between two or more courze3
of action, rights, or things by one who cannot enjoy the benefit of both."
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choice between going to the theatre and staying at home; and
we may make a choice between including such a case under the
term "election" and not so including it. Such a choice does not
either extinguish or create any legal relation, and is therefore
not the exercise of a legal power. Such a choice does not affect
societal action; and ordinary judicial usage does not include it
within the term "election".
Let us consider certain other specific instances frequently in-
volving litigation and affecting societal action:
(1) If an offer is made by A to B, the latter has a choice be-
tween accepting and not accepting. Sometimes he is said to have
an "option", but it is not usual to use the term "election". It
is clear, however, that the making of the choice may affect the
legal relations of the parties. Manifestation of acceptance
creates contractual relations and may also even affect "property"
interests. Not accepting, however, may take various forms, not
all of which would affect the legal relations of the parties. Re-
jection, one of these forms, would extinguish B's power of accept-
ance, and thus be itself the exercise of a legal power. A condi-
tional acceptance would extinguish B's power of acceptance and
would at the same time create such a power in A. Mere silence,
however,-one form of not accepting-would not in itself affect
the legal relations of the parties. In case of an offer to him, B
has a choice among more than two alternative courses of con-
duct, some of which will not affect legal relations.0
(2) In the case of a contract induced by fraud or a contract
with an infant, one of the parties has a choice, specifically pointed
out, between disaffirmance and ratification. He may "elect" be-
tween them. Disaffirmance will undo such legal relations as the
original transaction may have created and will make a subse-
quent ratification inoperative. Ratification will create legal re-
lations that the original transaction failed to create, and will make
a subsequent disaffirmance inoperative. Disregarding other pos-
sible alternative courses of conduct, either of these two would
be the exercise of a power.10
(3) A contract may in express terms provide for an election
between alternatives by one of the parties. If the promisee has
9 Coke put this case: "If I give unto you bne of my horses in my stable,
there you shall have the election." Quoted in Byrne, Law Dictionary.
Here the act of election would pass title to the horse chosen. But observe
that the donee would be equally privileged to choose none of the horses.
10 Thus in Law v. Law [1905] 1 Ch. 140, 158, the court said: "He de-
liberately made his election [to ratify], and by that election he is bound."
In Clough v. London & N. W. Ry. (1871) L. R. 7 Exch. 26, 34, the court
said: "the contract continues valid till the party defrauded has determined
his election by avoiding it." The same power of "election" exists upon
the happening of a condition subsequent. See Oakes v. Insurance Co.
(1883) 135 Mass. 248, 249.
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the choice of two performances by the other party, his notice of
election would be a condition precedent to his enforceable right.
Like other such conditions, it would be an operative fact that
affects legal relations. If it is the promisor who is given the
choice between two performances, either performance would
operate as a discharge of his duty; but by a definite election of
one alternative he would lose his power of discharging his duty
by performing the other.-
(4) In leases it is frequently provided that the lessor may re-
enter and terminate the lease in case of some specified breach by
the lessee. The term "election" is not commonly used in such a
case.'2 The re-entry by the lessor (or other specified act of ter-
mination) would be the exercise of a power, extinguishing the
property interest of the lessee and re-vesting it in the lessor. But
a forbearance to re-enter would not have such an effect, and it
seems would not change the legal relations of the parties. Prob-
ably the term "election" should not be extended to cover such
cases, except where the lease clearly gives the choice between
terminating the lease and doing an act that would thereafter pre-
vent such termination ("waive" the condition). 3 Of course,
"election" may be, and doubtless has been, used loosely to include
a choice between alternatives, one of which is a mere forbearance
to change any legal relations. This usage should be disapproved
in case an effort at reducing the term to scientific exactness of
meaning is to be made. At present such an effort seems to be
unnecessary.
14
(5) In the case of a bankrupt tenant, his trustee in bank-
ruptcy may elect to terminate the lease or to continue it as an
" See Dyer, fol. 18, pl. 104 (1537), putting the case where the lessee
might elect between paying the rent in pepper and paying in saffron.
12-But see Ewart, Waivcr Distributcd (1917) 69: "he has, upon the
happening of the breach, a right to elect whether the tenancy is to con-
tinue or to end."
13 In Clough v. L. & N. TV. By., supra note 10, at 34, the court said:
"If with knowledge of the forfeiture, by the receipt of rent or other un-
equivocal act, he shows his intention to treat the lease as subsisting, he
has determined his election forever, and can no longer avoid the lease."
14 It seems undesirable to say, for example, that a person may "elect"
between committing a tort or a crime and not committing it, or between
performing a contract and breaking it. Very likely the term "election"
should be used only in cases where the person making the choice has the
legal privilege of choosing either alternative. This idea was expressed in
Termes de la Ley as follows: "Election is where a man is left to his own
free will to take or do one thing or another, which he pleases." This is re-
peated in Burrill, Law Dictionary; Stroud, Law Dictionary; and in Bicrcc
v. Hutchins (1907) 205 U. S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 524. In this last case, Mr.
Justice Holmes further says: "the characteristic fact is that one party has
a choice independent of the assent of anyone else. But if a man owns
property he has no election to transfer it to another. He cannot make
the transfer unless the other assents."
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asset of the estate. His choice will depend upon its value as an
asset. As in case (4) above, the trustee's manifestation of his
election to terminate would revest the property interest in the
lessor, and would affect the contractual relations of the parties.
His manifestation of an election not to terminate would leave
the property interest unaffected, but would destroy the power to
terminate.1"
(6) An injured party is frequently said to have an "election"
of remedies. In certain tort cases, the injured party may elect
between trover and replevin or between trover and indebitatus
assumpsit. An unpaid seller of goods may sometimes elect be-
tween an action for the price and an action for damages. There
has been some conflict as to just what conduct constitutes an
"election" in such cases; but there is no doubt that an "election",
when held to exist, actually affects the legal relations of the
parties, both to each other and to the officers of society. The
property interest in a chattel, the right to payment, and the right
to judgment are all affected.10 The choice is between specified
alternatives, and the making of the choice affects legal relations
irrespective of which one is chosen.
Where a partner was induced by fraud to sell his share in
the partnership and the other partners later sold out in exchange
for shares of stock that greatly increased in value, the defrauded
partner had a choice among many remedies. Some of the possi-
bilities were rescission, trover, replevin, damages, and a decree
that the shares of stock should be held in trust.1
(7) Under some statutes a widow may elect to take either her
distributive share, or the homestead for life free of her hus-
band's debts. Her choice of the homestead creates in her spe-
cific property rights, and limits the rights of the creditors against
the executor to the value of the remaining estate, excluding the
homestead. On the other hand, a choice of the distributive share
instead of the homestead gives her a definite right against the
executor but no property rights in the homestead.18
There are many more possible examples," but it is believed that
these suffice to show that the making of an "election" is generally
the exercise of a legal power. The use of the term can be (al-
though perhaps it should not be) extended to include cases where
the choice of one or more of the alternatives would not affect
legal relations. Wherever the making of an "election" does in
fact affect legal relations, we should not hesitate to describe it as
Il In re Sherwood, Inc. (1913, C. C. A. 2d) 210 Fed. 754.
16 See Corbin, Waiver of Tort (1910) 19 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 221, 239.
17 Falk v. Hoffnn (1922) 233 N. Y. 199, 135 N. E. 243.
18 In re Lund's Estate (1899) 107 Iowa, 264, 77 N. W. 1048.
19 See, for further examples, Bigelow, Estoppel (5th ed. 1890) ch. 21,
"Election"; Bouvier, Law Dictionary, "Election."
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the exercise of a power, even though the profession may have
been accustomed to the word "power" only in certain special cases
like "power of appointment" and "power of attorney".
In the Vanatta case, the widow by her expression of will ma-
terially affected the legal relations of herself, her husband's
executor, and her husband's distributee. The fact that this made
'it the exercise of a power created by Jacob Vanatta's will does
not prevent the widow's "election" from being operative as an
exercise of power with respect to any assets, even including
stocks uninventoried because forgotten or thought to be of no
value10
WHEN DO CONTROVERSIES OVER THE LEGAL OPERATION OF A
STATUTE BECOME JUSTICIABLE?
The recent case of New Jersey v. Sargent (1926) 46 Sup. Ct.
122, presents the problem of how the confficting rights of the
State and Federal governments in navigable water courses should
best be brought before the court. The State of New Jersey
filed an original bill in equity in the United States Supreme Court
to obtain a judicial decision as to whether certain parts of the
Federal Water Power Act of 19201 were unconstitutional. The
state's contention was that the sections of the Act giving the
Federal government control of the building of dams in navigable
streams (through a licensing technique) infringed upon the rights
of the state to control watercourses for power purposes. - No
evidence was produced to show that the Federal government
had issued or was about to issue any license under the Act; or
that the state had made any appropriations for the building of
dams. A motion to dismiss the bill was granted on the ground
that no justiciable controversy was set forth for the court to
pass upon.
Under the prevailing procedure in the federal courts, the in-
stant decision is sound, as there seems to be no way in which
the court could have taken jurisdiction of the instant case unless
20 Her "election" was clearly the exercise of a legal pow.er, even within
the definitions of "power" quoted by the court in the instant case.
141 Stat. at L. 1063. For a detailed discussion of the scope of the Act
see Shields, TIw Federal Power Act (1925) 73 U. PA. L. REv. 142. The
Act creates a Federal Power Commission and provides for the improvement
of navigation, the development of water power, the use of the public lands
thereto, and repeals section 18 of the River and Harbor Appropriation Act
of 1917.
2A similar proceeding was started by the State of New York but was
not pressed for argument. Later a working construction was reached by
conference between the New York Water Commission and the Federal
Power Commission. 73 U. PA. L. Ruv. 142, 15G, note 31; Sherman, Con-
flicting Federal and State Jurisdiction Over Water Power (1925) N. Y.
S. B. A. 120-131.
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it could be brought within the general equity power of the court
to enjoin threatened injuries. But the injury threatened seemed
too remote to justify invoking this power.3 From a functional
viewpoint, however, the situation is decidedly unsatisfactory. As
it now stands neither the State nor the Federal government can
be certain of its rights and powers without taking some affirma-
tive step under the Act that is in itself wrongful, or that immedi-
ately threatens injury; until then there is no justiciable contro-
versy.4  If either party should err in judging the scope of the
Act, the monetary loss, not to mention the time and effort wasted
by legislatures and commissions would be tremendous. Such
waste as an incident to determining the constitutionality of an act
seems needless in view of the recent developments of the declara-
tory judgment.5 State declaratory judgment statutes have en-
larged the scope of "justiciable controversies" thereby enabling
parties to know in advance of action upon assumed rights, the
legal consequences of their proposed acts.0
To obtain a declaratory judgment the court must be satisfied
that an actual controversy exists between the parties to the suit.,
3 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law (1910) secs. 739, 744; Texas v. Inter-
state Commerce Commission (1921) 258 U. S. 158, 42 Sup. Ct. 261; Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon (1922) 262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597; Muskrat v. United
States (1910) 219 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 250.
4 Mr. Justice Van Devanter (in instant case, 46 Sup. Ct. 122, 125): "But
whether they (sections of the Act] are thus invalid cannot be made the
subject of judicial inquiry until they are given or are about to be given
some practical application and effect. Naturally this will be after they
become part of an accepted license, and after some right, privilege, im-
munity or duty asserted under them becomes the subject of actual contro-
versy." It should be observed that there was in this case an "actual contro-
versy" as to the rights, privileges, powdrs, and immunities created by the
Act of Congress. These are no different in kind from such legal relations
created by a "license"; but they pertain to state officers rather than to a
private citizen.
For a list of the nineteen states which now render declaratory judg-
ments, see COMMENTS (1926) 35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 473, note 1. For an
outline of the growth of the movement, see Sunderland, The Declaratory
Judgment (1917) 16 MICH. L. REv. 69; Borchard, The Declaratory Judg-
ment-A Needed Procedural Reform (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOUNAL, 1, 105;
COMMENTS (1920) 29 ibid. 545; Borchard, State Legislation on Declaratory
Judgments (1924) 18 Am. Pors. Sc. REv. 305.
6 "Declarations have in recent State cases been successfully sought in
the following .classes of cases: The construction of wills, trust deeds,
statutes and otdinances and the powers of statutory public bodies there-
under; the powers and privileges conferred by corporate charters or
by-laws; the construction of contracts, either before or after breach, includ-
ing leases and the legal relations of the parties thereto; and the trial of
claims to the enjoyment of property, real or personal." COMMENTS (1926)
35 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 477.
7" . jurisdiction will never be assumed unless the tribunal ap-
pealed to is satisfied that an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of
one, exists between parties all of whom are sui juris and before the court,
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If one of the parties to the action should do some act which would
put an end to the actual controversy, there is nothing left to be
decided, and on appeal the case would of course be dismissed.0
Nor could the declaratory judgment statute oblige or authorize a
declaration of legal relations where the rights of the parties would
not be finally decided.0 And it follows that where the party
suing has no actual interest there would be no more relief for
him under a declaratory judgment statute than there is under
non-statutory procedure.10
There is, however, a line of cases,1 exemplified by the instant
case, which seem proper for decision under a declaratory judg-
ment act. In the instant case there is an actual controversy in
the sense that both the State and the Federal governments claim
conflicting interests as regards the management and control of
certain watercourses. They are already asserting and denying
certain rights, powers, and privileges. There is a potential
further and more acrimonious controversy in the sense that
certainly in the near future, one of the parties or perhaps both,
and that the declaration sought will be a practical help in ending the contro-
versy. . . ." Von Bloschzisker, C. J., in Petition of Kariher (1925,
Pa.) 131 Atl. 265, 271.
8These are moot cases and of course the result would be the same even
though a declaration were sought under a declaratory judgment statute.
San Mateo County v. Southern Pao. Ry. (1885) 116 U. S. 138 (suit to en-
join collection of a tax; tax having been paid pending appeal) ; Singcr Co.
v. Wright (1891) 141 U. S. 696 (same); Dakota Co. v. Glidden (1882) 113
U. S. 222 (claim compromised pending appeal). And the same result
would obtain where the event rendering the cases moot occur. by the mere
lapse of time. Mills v. Gree (1895) 159 U. S. 651, 16 Sup. Ct. 132
(election which was sought to be enjoined held before court heard appeal);
Jones v. Montagve (1904) 194 U. S. 147, 24 Sup. Ct. 611 (same); Richard-
son v. McChesney (1910) 218 U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43 (same); Atherton
Mills v. Johnston (1922) 259 U. S. 13, 42 Sup. Ct. 422 (father sued to enjoin
discharge of son, but son was over the age affected by Labor Law before the
appeal was heard). It appears that the controversy between the New York
Water Commission and the Federal Power Commission had ceased. See
note 2, supra.
9 Gordon v. United States (1864) 117 U. S. 697 (final decision lay with
Treasury Department and Congress); See Hayburns Case (1792, U. S.)
2 Dall. 409, 411.
10 Lord v. Veazie (1850, U. S.) 8 How. 251 (pending appeal one party
to the suit acquired the other's interest) ; Cleveland -. Chamberlain (1801,
U. S.) 1 Black, 419 (same); Wood Paper Co. r. Heft (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall.
333 (same). Nor could the court render a declaratory judgment where
the parties to the suit were not the proper ones. Chcroaee Natiw? v.
Georgia (1831, U. S.) 5 Pet. 1; Stearns v. Wood (1914) 23G U. S. 75, 35
Sup. Ct. 229.
" Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra note 3; Texas v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, supra note 3; of. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia (1922) 262
U. S. 553, 43 Sup. Ct. 658 (although the court took jurisdiction in this case
there was a strong dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Brandeis. Had his
view prevailed the case would seem a fit one for a declaratory judgment).
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will do some act either consistent or inconsistent with the Act.
Grave uncertainty involving property interests hangs over both
parties. A declaratory judgment of those interests would be
binding and final. A declaratory judgment act would therefore
save much of the expense and the wasted effort incident to test-
ing constitutionality under present methods. The Federal Act
recommended by the American Bar Association should be passed,
for although it confers jurisdiction only on the lower federal
courts it would in many cases resolve the issue before it became
necessary to act upon one's own interpretation of his rights and
to incur the expense and loss now incident to the creation of a
so-called "justiciable controversy". 12 Such an act would not con-
fer a new kind of jurisdiction, since our courts admittedly have
jurisdiction to determine controversies and to prevent wrongs
before the injurious act occurs in many cases. It would merely
make it unnecessary for an injurious act to be so immediately
impending. The difference would be merely one of degree.
THE STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS FOR PAYMENT OF
DIVIDENDS OUT OF CAPITAL
There are statutes in practically every state, which make un-
lawful the payment of dividends out of capital;2 and directors
who violate them are made jointly and individually responsible
to the creditors of the corporation to the extent of the dividend,"
or for the debts of the corporation,4 or for the loss caused by such
declaration. Some make the directors responsible to the corpora-
tion as well,6 and others make such act a misdemeanor.T But
whether the responsibility thus imposed is absolute, irrespective
of fault, or whether it is dependent on bad faith or negligence
is a question upon which most of the statutes are silent; and since
clear cut holdings on this precise point are rare, a review of this
important problem seems warranted.
It was well settled at common law that directors who acted
in good faith and without negligence were not responsible for
12 The American Bar Association has urged the passage of a Federal
Declaratbry Judgment Act at recent meetings. See (1922) 8 A. B. A.
JouR. 554.
1 See infra notes 22, 23, 24, 25.
2 For the meaning of "capital", and "surplus profits" in this connection
see Clark, Corporations (3d ed. 1916) 422 et seq; 2 Cook, Corporations
(8th ed. 1923) 1896 et seq; NOTES (1919) 7 CALm'. L. RsV. 183; Paying
Dividends out of Capital (1908) 44 CAN. L. JOURN. 94.
3 E.g. Massachusetts, infra note 24; Idaho, infra note 25.
4 E.g. Colorado, infra note 23; Oregon, infra note 22.
5E.g. New Jersey, infra note 22; New York, infra note 25.
6 E.g. New York and California, infra note 25; Ohio, infra note 24.
7 E.g. New York, Cahill's Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 41, sec. 664; Connecticut
and Maine, infra.note 24.
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losses which resulted from their acts," although there was much
confusion over the degree of care 'which should be required of
them in the performance of their duties.2 Some courts have held
them responsible only for fraud or for negligence which was so
gross as to amount to fraud ;1o and directors have, therefore, been
excused for bona-fide errors of judgment, no matter how reckless
and absurd they might appear when measured by the standards
of ordinary business prudence. Other courts have adopted the
more stringent standard of requiring the director to use such
care and prudence as business men generally exercise in manag-
ing their own affairs.- Still other decisions have taken the inter-
mediate position of requiring the same degree of care as a reason-
ably prudent man would use under the same circumstances.':
These same tests of general responsibility were apparently in-
voked when actions were brought against directors for a wrong-
ful declaration of dividends. Where they were guilty of fraud
or were negligent, the directors were held accountable;' but
where these elements were lacking they were absolved from re-
sponsibility,' -
In England,1" the situation was dealt with by the Companies
Act of 1862, which provided that "no dividend shall be payable
except out of profits" ' and which empowered the court in wind-
8 Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 646; 3 Cook, op. cit. wpra. note 2, at
2855 et seq; 2 Thompson, Corporations (1395) 2997; 2 Lindley, Com-
panies (6th ed. 1902) 523; 2 DIorawetz, Private Corporations (2d ed.
1866) 528; Godbold v. Branch Bank (1847) 11 Ala. (N.s.) 191; Spering's
Appeal (1872) 71 Pa. 11; Hodges v. New England Screw Co. (1850) 1
R. I. 312; Scott v. Depeyster (1832, N. Y.) 1 Edw. Ch. 513; Watt's Appcal
(1875) 78 Pa. 370; Booth v. Dexter Steam Fire Engine Co. (1897) 118
Ala. 369, 24 So. 405.
9 Dwight, Liability of Corporate Directors (1907) 17 YAL LW JOU11IAL,
33.
FoSpering's Appeal, supra note 8.
,11 Hun v. Gary (1880) 82 N. Y. 65; Hanna v. Lyon (1904) 179 N. Y.
107, 71 N. E. 778; General Rubber Co. v. Benedict (1915) 215 N. Y. 18,
109 N. E. 96; Horn Silcer Minsing Co. r. Ryan (1889) 42 Minn. 196, 44
N. W. 56; Shea v. Mabry (1878, Tenn.) 1 Lea, 319; See 3 Thompoon, op. cit.
aupra note 8, at 3000.
r! See Stone v. Rottman (1904) 183 Mo. 552, 573, 82 S. W. 76, 82;
Canrington v. Basshor Co. (1912) 118 Md. 419, 84 Atl. 716; Briggs v.
SpezudSg (1891) 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup Ct. 924; ,ee 1 Morawetz, op cit.
supra note 8, at 527.
- Gratz v. Redd (1843, Ky.) 4 B. Mon. 178 (here the directors paid
dividends before paying interest on borrowed money, Imowing that there
weren't sufficient funds.)
'4 Cf. Lexington, and Ohio Ry. v. Bridges (1847, Ky.) 7 B. ',Mon. 556.
In Blythe v. EnsIevn (1923) 209 Ala. 96, 95 So. 479, where no statute was
mentioned, the court held that when the dividend was declared because
of bad judgment and not bad faith, the directors were not responsible.
13 For a general discussion of the English cases, see 1 Lindley, op cit.
supra note 8, at 523 et seq., 603 ct seq; Paying Dividends out of Capital,
supra note 2.
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ing-up proceedings to compel a director who had been "guilty of
any misfeasance or breach of trust in relation to the company"
to repay misapplied funds.'7 Under this and subsequent similar
acts, directors were held responsible when dividends were know-
ingly,5 or negligently' declared out of capital, but not when
the directors had used reasonable care in such payments.20
In America, some of the statutes clearly indicate that an
absolute responsibility was not intended, but others are most
obscure; and there have been relatively few cases interpreting
them. In spite of the differences in the wording of these statutes,
a classification into four general groups is possible. The statu-
tory responsibility may be imposed :21 (1) upon directors who
"knowingly" declare and pay such dividends ;215(2) upon directors
"assenting to" them ;3 (3) upon directors who "vote for" or
"declare" them ;24 (4) upon directors "under whose administra-
tion" such dividends are declared.
2
5
16 (1862) 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89, Table A, rule 73.
17 (1862) 25 & 26 Vict., ch. 89, sec. 165.
is Re National Funds Assurance Co. (1878) 10 Ch. Div. 118; Flitcroft'e
Case (1882) 21 Ch. Div. 519.
19Leeds Estate Building Co. v. Shepherd (1887) 36 Ch. Div. 787; Re
Oxford Building Society (1886) 35 Ch. Div. 502.
20 St rnger's Case (1869) L. R. 4 Ch. 475 (bad debts owed by tho
Confederacy were included as assets) ; Re London and General Bank (1894,
Ch.) 72 L. T. R. 227 (under a similar section in the Winding Up Act of
1890, ch. 63, sec. 10); Dovey v. Cory [1901, H. L.] A. C. 477; Prefontaine
v. Grenier [1907, P. C] A. C. 101.
- Practically all the statutes provide that a director who causes his
dissent to be entered on the records of the corporation shall be absolved.
22Ark. Crawford and Moses Digest, 1921, ch. 38, sec. 1729; Del. Rev.
Code, 1915, ch. 65, sec. 1949 ("wilful or negligent violation"); Fla. Rev.
Gen. Sts. 1920, Div. 4, Tit. 3, sec. 4119 ("knowingly"); Kan. Rev. Sts. 1923,
ch. 17, sec. 609; Iowa, Comp. Code, 1919, Tit. 17, ch. 1, see. 5352 ("knowingly
consenting"); Mich. Comp. Laws (Cahill) 1922, ch. 173, sec. 9053, sub.
sec. 70; Mo. Rev. Sts. 1919, ch. 90, Art. 1, sec. 9761; N. J. Comp. Sts.
1911, Corporations, see. 30, p. 1617 ("wilful or negligent"); Or. Gen. Laws,
1920, Tit. 34, ch. 3, sec. 6873; R. I. Gen. Laws, 1923, Tit. 24, ch. 248, see.
3506 ("intentional or negligent"); Tex. Sayle's Civ. Sts. 1914, Tit. 25,
ch. 8, art. 1200; Va. Gen. Laws, 1923, Tit. 34, ch. 147, sec. 3840; Wis. Sts.
1921, ch. 85, sec. 1765 ("if directors acted not having reason to believe
there were sufficient net profits"). In Victoria, Australia, Companies Act,
1915, see. 277 a director who "wilfully" pays dividends out of what he
knows is not profits is made responsible to the creditors and'is liable to
a criminal punishment.
23 Colo. Comp. Laws, 1921, ch. 38, sec. 2270, subsec. 33; 111. Rev. Sts.
1921, ch. 32, see. 23; Miss. 2 Hemmingway's Code, 1917, ec'. 4097; Vt.
Gen. Laws, 1917, ch. 210, sec. 4939.
24J]Ky. Carroll's Sts. 1915, ch. 32, sec. 548; Me. Rev. Sts. 1916, ch. 51, see.
34; Md. Bagby's Code, 1924, Art. 23, see. 87; Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921,
ch. 156, sec. 37, ch. 158, see. 44; N. H. Pub. Sts. 1901, ch. 150, sees. 3, 5;
Ohio, Page's Ann. Code, 1926, sees. 8724, 8728; Pa. Sts. 1920, sees.
5974, 5975; Conn. Gen. Sts. 1918, ch. 188, see. 3423.
2; N. Mex. Code, 1915, ch. 23, sec. 918; N. Y. Cahill's Cons, Laws.
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The statutes of the first group make knowledge that the divi-
dend is not being paid out of profits or surplus a condition
precedent to the responsibility of the director, : and hence the
problem of responsibility without fault does not arise in these
states. "Assenting to" in the second group presents more diffi-
culties, for it is not clear just what the legislatures meant to
require; but a provision of this kind has been interpreted as
requiring knowledge on the part of the directors (or gross negli-
gence in failing to discover) that they are declaring dividends
out of capital.27 A later Federal case went even further, hold-
ing that mere negligence was not sufficient.2"-
The real difficulty of construction, however, arises when statutes
of the last two groups are involved, for their language offers no
indication at all as to whether the legislatures meant to codify
the common law rule or to lay down a new rule of absolute re-
sponsibility. In construing a statute of the last group, a Cali-
fornia court in a strong dictum declared that it was not a mere
restatement of the common law rule, but that it imposed a
responsibility irrespective of the good faith and diligence of the
director. 2 9  There, however, the facts indicated a clear case of
negligenceY° A similar statute was construed much more liber-
1923, ch. 60, see. 58; N. C. Cons. Sts. 1919, ch. 22, sec. 1179; N. D. Comp.
Laws, 1913, sec. 4543, 4544; Wash. Comp. Sts. 1922, Tit. 25, scm. 2824;
Calif. Civ. Code, 1923, see. 309; Nev. Rev. Laws, 1921, see. 1169, sub. cee.
68; Mont. Rev. Codes, 1921, Civ. Code Part 3, ch. 4, sec. 5939; Idaho,
Comp. Sts. 1919, ch. 186, sec. 4715; Okla. Comp. Sts. 1921, th. 34, sec.
5336.
2-3 Parsons v. Rinard Grain Co. (1919) 186 Iowa, 1017, 173 N. W. 276.
Here the statute held the directors for "knowingly con-enting" to exccz-
sive indebtedness, and the court said "actual knowledge is required
that which might have been obtained by due care is not enough."
27 Chick v. Fuller (1902, C. C. A. 7th) 114 Fed. 22. Here the president,
who was the active manager of the corporation, had deceitfully swindled
it by embezzling the proceeds of the goods sold and by falsifying the boohs.
The directors relying on correctness of the books declared a dividend
when in fact there were no profits. The court held that inasmuch as
there was nothing to show that the directors had any reason to suspect
the president's integrity, and as men of ordinary prudence would not have
discovered the fraud, they were not responsible. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals here did not expressly mention the Illinois statute; but it affirmed the
holding of the lower court which based it-&76sion upon it.
White-Wilson-Drezv Co. v. Lyon-Ratcliff Co. (1920, C. C. A. 7th) 208
Fed. 525; see also Patterson v. Mirnesota Mfg. Co. (1889) 41 MIi . 84,
93, 42 N. W. 926, 929; Lcwis v,. Montgornry (1893) 145 Ill. App. 30, 48,
33 N. E. 880, 884.
2V See Southern Calif. Homo Builders v. Young (1920) 45 Calif. App.
679, 691, 188 Pac. 586, 592.
o Although the defendants contended that they relied on statements
prepared for them, the court said that it was inconceivable that they could
have exercised ordinary prudence in failing to detect an overvaluation of
assets of more than a half million dollars. The court intimated that in
cases of exceptional circumstances such as presented in Chick: v. Fuller,
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ally by a Federal court which said " . directors who had
in good faith declared and paid a dividend on the reasonable as-
sumption of there being surplus earnings to be distributed
would not be within the provisions of the statute." -1
The early New York decisions seem to favor the honest direc-
tor, one case holding that while the plaintiff need not allege that
the director knowingly declared the dividend out of capital, if the
latter sets up and proves due care he is not responsible." Like-
wise, in a later case,33 the court said that where there was no
fraud in the transaction and no question of negligence was raised
by the pleadings, the directors should not be held. But in Wesp
v. Muckle,34 while the real question at issue was whether the
books of the corporation were admissible as evidence, the court
suggested obiter that the statute imposed a more stringent rule
of responsibility not conditioned upon good faith and diligence.
In that case, however, as in the California case, the directors
had obviously been negligent;35 hence, it is conjectural whether
the New York courts would hold a director where the elements
of mala fides and negligence were entirely lacking.
The nature of the responsibility imposed by these statutes is
a factor which should influence their interpretation. The treatise
writers0 and many courts37 regard them as penal; and hence, as
supra note 27, good faith and diligence would be a defense.
31 See United States Smelting Co. v. Hofkin (1917, E. D. Pa.) 245 Fed.
896, 898; cf. United States Smelting Co. v. Hofkin (1919, E. D. Pa.) 261
Fed. 546, rev'd in (1920, C. C. A. 3d) 266 Fed. 679. In Moore v. Murchison
(1915, C. C. A. 4th) 226 Fed. 679, 681, the court said, "It is well settled
that when directors declare a dividend in good faith and without negligence,
they are not to be held liable merely because the dividend turns out to have
impaired capital stock", citing Briggs v. Spaulding, supra note 12; Chick v.
Fuller, supra note 27.
Gaffney v. Colvill (1844, N. Y.) 6 Hill, 567. In Scott 'V. Depeyster,
supra note 8, the court held that directors are not personally responsible
to stockholders unless there has been fraud or negligence. Where the
directors were negligently ignorant of the facts which it was their duty to
know they were not excused. See Osgood v. Laytin (1867, N. Y.) 3 Keyes,
521, 523.
- Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey (1875) 63 N. Y. 422. This case
has been cited for the proposition that good faith plus due care is a
defense under such statutes. 2 Morawetz, op. cit. supra note 8, at 533; 2
Clark and Marshall, Private Corporations (1903) 1639. In fact, however,
this case was decided on common law grounds, as the action was brought
under a statute which was not applicable to the case.
34 (1910, 4th Dept.) 136 App. Div. 241, 120 N. Y. Supp. 976.
z' The assets were appraised at $70,000 when the dividend was paid.
Six months later the property was sold for $9,000. Such a glaring in-
flation could not have been made if ordinary care and prudence had been
used.
36 3 Thompson, op. cit. supra. note 8, at 3155; Clark, op. cit. supra, note 2,
at 755; 2 Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, at 1933.
3 See Rorke v. Thomas (1874) 56 N. Y. 559, 564; Bruce v. Platt (1880)
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is true in the case of all penal statutes, where there is any doubt
as to their construction, such doubt should be resolved in favor
of the defendant. Here, there is indeed a great doubt as to
whether an insurer's responsibility was intended. Courts which
refuse to call these statutes penal do, nevertheless, say that they
are to be construed strictly in favor of the defendant.3 What
seems to be the proper rule of construction was applied by a
Georgia court 9 in a case involving a statute making it a misde-
meanor to declare dividends out of capital. The court said,
"The code section in question does not contain an express pro-
vision relieving a president or director from criminal liability
when he declares a dividend in good faith believing that the bank
has earned it, yet it seems to be the correct view that such an
exception exists by implication. . ." This rule, it is believed,
although enunciated in relation to a criminal statute, should be
applied to civil statutes covering the same acts.
In order that the modern commercial and industrial machine
which has so emphatically adopted the corporate form may
function to its maximum efficiency, it is indeed necessary that
the best business men be retained as directors. To construe
these statutes as placing on directors a responsibility for non-
negligent, non-fraudulent acts would render the risk of accept-
ing such offices almost prohibitive. The problem was aptly
described by an English judge,-' "One must be very careful
. . .not to press so hardly on honest directors as to make
them liable for these constructive defaults, the only effect of
which would be to deter all men of any property, and perhaps
all men who have any character to lose from becoming directors
of companies at all. On the one hand, I think the Court should
do its utmost to bring fraudulent directors to account, and on the
other hand, should also do its best to allow honest men to act
reasonably as directors."
80 N. Y. 379, 381 (statutory responsibility for failing to file report); Pattci-
sou v. Thompson (1898, C. C. D. Or.) 86 Fed. 85; Patki-on0 v. Wadc
(1902, C. C. A. 9th) 115 Fed. 770; Contihnental Oil Co. v. Montana Concrete
Co. (1922) 63 Mont. 223, 207 Pac. 116; Pattcron z v. Mimzcota Mfg. Cc.,
supra note 28; 4l7hiteWfIson-Drc., Co. r. Lyon-Ratcliff Co., -upra note 23
- Parsons -e. Rird Grain Co., supra note 26; Lcwis v. Montgrncry,
supra note 28.
39 Cabaniss v. State (1910) 8 Ga. App. 129, 68 S. E. 849. In a ater
case under this statute the court held that where the director was prezent
when the dividend was declared the burden was on him to show that he
did not know the financial condition of the bank. Mangham v. State
(1912) 11 Ga. App. 440, 75 S. E. 50S.
40 Sir George Jessel in Re Forest of Dcan Coal Mining Co. (1878) 10
Ch. Div. 450, 451.
